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Contemporary natural-language semantics began with the assumption 
that the meaning of a sentence could be modeled by a single truth-
condition, or by an entity with a truth-condition. But with the recent 
explosion of dynamic semantics and pragmatics and of work on non-
truth-conditional dimensions of linguistic meaning, we are now in the 
midst of a shift away from a truth-condition-centric view and toward 
the idea that a sentence’s meaning must be spelled out in terms of its 
various roles in conversation. This communicative turn in seman-
tics raises historical questions: Why was truth-conditional semantics 
dominant in the first place, and why were the phenomena now driv-
ing the communicative turn initially ignored or misunderstood by 
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truth-conditional semanticists? I offer a historical answer to both ques-
tions. The history of natural-language semantics—springing from the 
work of Donald Davidson and Richard Montague—began with a meth-
odological toolkit that Frege, Tarski, Carnap, and others had created to 
better understand artificial languages. For them, the study of linguistic 
meaning was subservient to other explanatory goals in logic, philoso-
phy, and the foundations of mathematics, and this subservience was 
reflected in the fact that they idealized away from all aspects of meaning 
that get in the way of a one-to-one correspondence between sentences 
and truth-conditions. The truth-conditional beginnings of natural-
language semantics are best explained by the fact that, upon turning 
their attention to the empirical study of natural language, Davidson 
and Montague adopted the methodological toolkit assembled by Frege, 
Tarski, and Carnap and, along with it, their idealization away from 
non-truth-conditional semantic phenomena. But this pivot in explana-
tory priorities toward natural language itself rendered the adoption of 
the truth-conditional idealization inappropriate. Lifting the truth-con-
ditional idealization has forced semanticists to upend the conception of 
linguistic meaning that was originally embodied in their methodology.
1  Truth-Conditional Semantics and the 
Communicative Turn
The most fundamental way of dividing up approaches to linguistic 
meaning is on the basis of how they answer a question best articulated 
by David Lewis: ‘In order to say what a meaning is, we may first ask 
what a meaning does, and then find something that does that’ (1970: 
193). Meaning is a theoretical posit, and so our theory of it has to be 
grounded in the explanatory role that we posit it to play. Lewis’ ques-
tion is the one raised by his methodological advice: What is the explana-
tory role of linguistic meaning? My goal in this section is to document a 
fundamental shift in how semanticists have answered this question over 
the last several decades.
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Lewis’ own answer to his question was that the meaning of a sen-
tence ‘is something that determines the conditions under which a sen-
tence is true or false’ (1970: 193). Versions of this answer dominated 
natural-language semantics from its contemporary beginnings in the 
work of Donald Davidson (1965, 1967a, 1970) and Richard Montague 
(1970a, b, 1973) until recently. If we use ‘truth-conditional semantics’ 
as a broad covering term for any theoretical approach that articulates 
or embodies a truth-condition-centric answer to Lewis’ question, then 
many debates about how to do semantics are disputes between differ-
ent species of semanticists within the truth-conditional genus. For 
example, are sentences’ semantic values1 functions from possible worlds 
to truth-values (Cresswell 1973; Lewis 1970, 1975a; von Fintel and 
Heim 2011), functions from more elaborate indices to truth-values 
(e.g., Montague 1974; Brogaard 2012; Egan et al. 2005; Lasersohn 
2005; MacFarlane 2014; Richard 2010), sets of centered worlds (Lewis 
1979b), sets of situations (Barwise and Perry 1983), structured com-
plexes made up of objects and properties (Russell 1903, 1918; Soames 
1987), structured complexes made up of abstract modes of presenta-
tion (Frege 1892a, b; Evans 1982; Zalta 1988), or structured entities 
of other kinds (King 2007; Soames 2010)? These debates have all taken 
place within truth-conditional semantics as I conceive of it. The defend-
ers of each of these views agree that the role of a sentence’s meaning is 
to determine its truth-condition; what they disagree about is what sorts 
of posits best play the role of truth-conditional meanings.
A similar point can be made about the debates between Davidson 
and his followers, on one hand, and semanticists working in Montague’s 
model-theoretic tradition, on the other. Davidson’s work represents 
both the beginning of the contemporary era of natural-language seman-
tics and the beginning of its truth-conditional paradigm (1965, 1967a, 
1970). In order to answer Lewis’ question, however, Davidson would 
have had to interpret it somewhat differently than Lewis did, because 
Davidson explicitly rejected the idea that a sentence’s meaning is an 
entity to which it bears a semantic relation. This makes it somewhat dif-
ficult to generalize across Davidsonian and non-Davidsonian versions of 
truth-conditional semantics. But we can translate Lewis’ question into 
Davidsonian idiom as follows: ‘what aspect of a linguistic expression 
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should a theory of meaning explain?’ And Davidson’s answer is clear: 
a theory of meaning should explain how expressions contribute to the 
truth-conditions of sentences of which they are parts. So although it 
would not make sense for a Davidsonian to talk of the composition of 
semantic values—Davidsonians would prefer ‘the canonical derivations 
of T-theorems’—it does make sense to apply the covering term ‘truth-
conditional semanticists’ to both Davidsonians and the others I have 
mentioned insofar as they all take the task of a theory of meaning to be 
the systematic prediction of sentences’ truth-conditions.
Truth-conditional semantics is an active research program, and 
most introductory semantics textbooks still embody truth-conditional 
assumptions.2 But natural-language semantics is now experiencing a 
major shift away from the foundational assumption that defines its 
truth-conditional strain. The best-known moniker for this shift is ‘the 
dynamic turn,’ which picks up on the rise of dynamic semantics and the 
dynamic-pragmatic environment that is increasingly presupposed even 
by non-dynamic approaches to semantics. (I will say more about both 
of these options below.) The shift with which I am concerned is broader 
than the dynamic turn, and subsumes it, in that it includes several other 
moves away from truth-conditional semantics and toward various ver-
sions of the idea that the meaning of an expression is its role in com-
munication or conversation. For this reason, I will call the shift, the 
communicative turn.
The communicative turn, as I understand it, contains multitudes; 
it includes revisionary proposals that are not all mutually compatible, 
and some of which are pitched in terms of mutually inconsistent theo-
retical frameworks. But these heterogenous proposals have been driven 
by a consistent collection of data arising from five kinds of linguistic 
phenomena: non-declarative clauses, context-sensitivity, presupposi-
tion, conventional implicature, and expressive meaning. Sentences that 
exhibit these phenomena have been found to require revisionary seman-
tic treatments either because they cannot be understood in terms of 
truth-conditional meaning (but are still meaningful), or because under-
standing them requires positing supplemental dimensions of meaning 
beyond truth-conditional content.
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A paradigmatic example involves non-declarative clauses, including 
interrogatives (e.g. (1)) and imperatives (e.g. (2)).
(1) Did Frege discover any important dance steps?
(2) Give my dog a bath!
It seems to be a category mistake to call sentences like these true or 
false, and so to ascribe truth-conditions to them.3 If this intuition is 
correct, then the meanings of non-declaratives will have to be cashed 
out in non-truth-conditional terms. The obvious next step in this line 
of reasoning is to point out that clauses of different types differ prin-
cipally in terms of what they are used to do in conversation: interroga-
tives are for asking questions, and imperatives are for issuing directives. 
This pre-theoretic idea has been cashed out semantically by a variety 
of suggestions to the effect that clauses’ semantic values be identified 
with the types of speech acts for which they can be directly and liter-
ally used (Searle 1969; Alston 2000; Barker 2004; Harris 2014). These 
proposals vary depending on the underlying theory of speech acts they 
incorporate.
By far the most influential approaches to non-declaratives, and to 
non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning in general, have been built 
around dynamic models of conversation of the kind first proposed by 
Robert Stalnaker (1978, 2014). Conversations, on this model, take 
place against the background of a shared common ground made up of 
the propositions presupposed by all of the participants in a conversa-
tion. Taking propositions to be sets of possible worlds, Stalnaker defines 
the context set of a conversation as the intersection of the propositions 
in the common ground—the set of worlds compatible the participants’ 
presuppositions. Assertion is understood as the act of adding the seman-
tic value of the declarative sentence one utters to the common ground 
(or, equivalently, as intersecting its propositional content with the con-
text set). The semantic value of a declarative sentence is thus cast as the 
raw material for assertion. A conversation consisting solely of utter-
ances of declarative sentences can then be understood as a ‘joint inquiry’ 
whose goal is to zero in on the way the world actually is by adding more 
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information to the common ground through a series of assertions, thus 
shrinking the number of possibilities in the context set.
These ideas—conversational context as a body of shared representa-
tions, speech acts as ways of updating these representations, and sen-
tence meanings as the raw material for these updates—have been 
generalized in a wide variety of ways. David Lewis (1979a) conceives 
of conversational context as a scoreboard that keeps track of various 
facts about what is happening in the conversation in much the same 
way that a baseball scoreboard keeps track of numerous facts about the 
current state of a game. Just as different events in a baseball game affect 
the score in different ways—adding strikes, balls, runs, outs, etc.—dif-
ferent speech acts, performed with different kinds of sentences, update 
the conversational score in different ways. The context is thus a mul-
tidimensional representation, with different speech acts understood in 
terms of the different dimensions of the score they characteristically 
update. It is a short jump from this conception of conversation to the 
idea that sentences possess multiple dimensions of meaning, each serv-
ing as the raw material for updating some particular dimension of the 
context. Semanticists have now made this jump in many different ways. 
The resulting theories are classified as versions of either dynamic seman-
tics or dynamic pragmatics, depending on whether they posit seman-
tic or pragmatic mechanisms by which context is updated (Lewis 2011, 
2014).
The most influential current approaches to the meanings of non-
declarative clauses are a case in point. It is now widely thought that the 
context of a conversation tracks not only the common ground, but also 
the collection of questions under discussion, which model the issues that 
speakers want to resolve and which determine which speech acts are 
relevant (Roberts 2012 [1996]), as well as the to-do list, which tracks 
speakers’ practical commitments (Portner 2004).4 Just as asserting a 
proposition is adding it to the common ground, asking a question is 
adding it to the context’s questions under discussion, and command-
ing or requesting that someone do something is adding an item to the 
context’s to-do list. Moreover, just as the semantic values of declara-
tives are modeled as the raw material for assertions, the semantic val-
ues of non-declaratives are modeled as the raw material for speech acts 
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of the appropriate types. This is accomplished in either of two ways: in 
dynamic-semantic frameworks, the semantic value of a clause is its con-
text-change potential—a function that maps possible states of the con-
text to other possible states (e.g., Ciardelli et al. 2013; Starr ms ). The 
semantic value of an interrogative clause, on this view, is a function that 
takes some context as an input and outputs a context that differs only 
in that it contains a new question under discussion. In dynamic-prag-
matic frameworks, clauses’ semantic values do not contain instructions 
for updating the context, but are instead model-theoretic objects of 
types that fit into different dimensions of the context, so that it is easy 
to offer a pragmatic explanation of how uttering a sentence with such 
a semantic value updates the context in the appropriate way (Portner 
2004). In either framework, what unites the semantic values of all three 
clause-types—what makes them all kinds of meaning—is that they are 
the properties of sentences that allow speakers who utter them to move 
a conversation forward in predictable ways.
Dynamic-semantic and dynamic-pragmatic frameworks have rep-
resented the endpoints of a variety of other moves away from truth-
conditional semantics over the last three decades. Many examples have 
recently gone under the heading of ‘expressivism’—a label which was 
originally used to describe approaches to ethical non-cognitivism that 
construe the use of normative language (‘ought,’ ‘good,’ ‘right,’ etc.) as 
non-descriptive, the speech acts performed with such language as non-
assertoric, and the mental states those speech acts express or bring about 
as non-cognitive. Versions of expressivism have been defended by phi-
losophers for decades, but the view has recently made its way into main-
stream semantic theory via the marriage of Alan Gibbard’s (1990, 2003) 
model of expressive content with dynamic models of conversation. On 
views of this kind, conversational contexts contain, in addition to an 
informational dimension, a practical dimension, which represent agents’ 
normative or practical commitments. The function of normative speech 
is to update this practical dimension of context in the same way that 
descriptive speech is used to update the context’s informational dimen-
sion. By characterizing expressivism in dynamic terms—as the position 
that some expressions have the function of updating the conversational 
context in non-assertoric ways—this work has set the stage for dynamic 
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and expressivist treatments of normative vocabulary (Pérez-Carballo 
2014; Pérez-Carballo and Santorio 2016; Yalcin 2012), epistemic 
modals (Veltman 1996; Yalcin 2007), indicative conditionals (Gillies 
2010; Starr 2010), and deontic modals (Charlow 2015, 2016).
Not all defenses of expressive meaning include commitment to 
dynamic semantics or dynamic pragmatics, though all versions point to 
a multidimensional and communication-centric conceptions of linguis-
tic meaning. Potts (2005, 2007, 2012) singles out a category of expres-
sions he calls ‘expressives’—examples include ‘please,’ along with various 
expletives and pejoratives—and argues that their semantic values must 
consist of something other than regular truth-conditional content on 
the grounds that the expressive components of their meanings do not 
compose normally with the semantic values of other expressions into 
which they are embedded. Although Potts does not defend a positive 
theory of expressives’ semantic values, he argues that any such position 
would have to situate their meanings in some theory of conversation 
(2005: chap. 2).
Another class of arguments has pushed the idea that many sentences 
can be used to express propositional contents in more than one way 
at once. According to most contemporary semanticists, a speaker who 
utters (3) presupposes that someone ate the pancakes and asserts that Fido 
did it, for example. And, following Potts (2005), many semanticists 
now think that a speaker who utters (4) conventionally implicates that 
Shaq is huge and agile and asserts that Shaq plays for the Lakers.
(3) It was Fido that ate the pancakes.
(4) Shaq, who is huge and agile, played for the Lakers.
Along with factive verbs, definite noun phrases, aspectual verbs, and other 
expressions, it-clefts like the one with which (3) begins are commonly 
taken to be presupposition triggers—expressions whose utterance signals 
the speaker’s presuppositions (Beaver and Geurts 2011: §1). Similarly, 
non-restrictive relative clauses, such as the one in (4), are understood to 
be conventional-implicature triggers.
Although the contents of presuppositions and conventional impli-
catures can be modeled as truth-conditions or truth-condition-bearing 
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entities, there are excellent reasons to distinguish both from the pri-
mary truth-conditional content a speaker asserts or expresses in uttering 
a sentence. The latter is now often described as at-issue content to dis-
tinguish it from presuppositions, conventional implicatures, and other 
kinds of not-at-issue content (Murray 2014; Potts 2005; Tonhauser 
2012). Unlike at-issue contents, not-at-issue contents project, which is 
to say that they are expressed even if their triggers are embedded under 
negation, in the consequents of conditionals, and in various other envi-
ronments that block speakers’ commitment to at-issue content. For 
example, a speaker signals their presupposition that someone ate the 
pancakes even if they say, ‘It wasn’t Fido who ate the pancakes,’ or ‘If it 
was Fido who ate the pancakes, then he should be punished.’ The pre-
diction and explanation of this projection behavior are now widely held 
to be among the tasks of semantic theory (Beaver and Geurts 2011; 
Potts 2005: §2.4.3; Simons et al. 2010; Soames 1989). A full charac-
terization of the at-issue/not-at-issue distinction requires characterizing 
the different conversational roles of the two kinds of content. This is 
reflected in the standard terminology: it is most natural to distinguish 
the at-issue, presuppositional, and conventional-implicative dimensions 
of linguistic meaning by distinguishing the act of asserting, the act of 
presupposing (or of signaling one’s presuppositions), and the act of con-
ventionally implicating, respectively. The ‘at-issue’/‘not-at-issue’ labels 
themselves are used to distinguish two ways in which speakers can sig-
nal their commitments through speech. Uttering a sentence commits 
the speaker to the at-issue content she expresses in a way that can be 
directly challenged, whereas the not-at-issue contents enter the con-
versation surreptitiously, and require more (and more conversationally 
disruptive) effort to reject (von Fintel 2004; Potts 2005, §2.4.3). As 
in the case of recent work on non-declaratives and expressivism, these 
ideas have been worked out in detail within dynamic-semantic and 
dynamic-pragmatic theories of not-at-issue content, and many linguists 
now believe that satisfactory semantic theories of not-at-issue meaning 
must be spelled out in the context of theories of conversational dynam-
ics (Beaver 2001; Chierchia 1995; Heim 1983b; Murray 2014; Simons 
et al. 2010; Stalnaker 1974; for an overview, see Beaver and Geurts 
2011, §4.2–4.3).
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The last source of the communicative turn that I will discuss is lin-
guistic context-sensitivity. The sentence ‘I am here now’ does not have 
a truth-condition, or has one only relative to some assignment of 
semantic values to ‘I,’ ‘here,’ ‘now,’ and the sentence’s tense morphol-
ogy. This alone necessitates revising the original targets of truth-condi-
tional semantics, shifting the focus away from sentences to utterances 
(Davidson 1967a) or sentences indexed to formally modeled con-
texts (Lewis 1980; Kaplan 1989a). The most influential attempt to 
make sense of context-sensitivity within truth-conditional seman-
tics is Kaplan’s (1989a) logic of demonstratives, in which expressions 
are assigned semantic values relative to a set of coordinates modeling 
aspects of the context in which an expression is uttered. But the ubiq-
uity of context-sensitivity in natural language and the impossibility 
of explaining much of it in Kaplanian terms have motivated a vari-
ety of moves away from truth-conditional approaches. Although the 
Kaplanian approach seems to work well for so-called automatic indexi-
cals, such as ‘I,’ which always refers to the speaker, it has long been clear 
that something less algorithmic is going on with many other expres-
sions. To take just two particularly puzzling examples, we can use 
demonstratives (‘this,’ ‘that’) to refer to just about any intended object 
(Bach 1987, 1992; Kaplan 1989b; King 2012; Kripke 1977), and 
we can use incomplete determiner phrases (‘every beer,’ ‘the table’) in 
seemingly arbitrarily restricted ways (Neale 1990, 2004). Kaplanians 
have struggled to accommodate the semantics of expressions like these 
because what speakers say with them seems not to boil down to the 
kind of stable and predictable aspects of context that can be built into 
a formal model ahead of time. Other examples of seemingly open-
ended context-sensitivity have piled up in the literature, suggesting that 
the underdetermination of truth-conditions by linguistic meaning is a 
deep and pervasive fact about how natural language works.5 One kind 
of response to this problem, which is inspired by the intentionalist pro-
gram of Paul Grice (1957, 1968) and Stephen Schiffer (1972, 1981), 
has been to abandon the idea that sentence meanings are truth-condi-
tions or entities with truth-conditions, and to instead understand them 
as constraints of various strengths on the propositions that speakers can 
express, on the intentions they can have, or on the speech acts they can 
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perform in uttering a sentence (Bach 1987, 2005; Devitt ms; Harris 
2014; Neale 2004; Schiffer 1993, 2003).
A similar view has been reached from a different direction by Pauline 
Jacobson and other variable-free semanticists who have taken her lead. 
Although Jacobson begins her recent semantics textbook with truth-
conditional rhetoric (2014: §2.2), she identifies the semantic values of 
context-sensitive sentences (such as ‘he left,’ where ‘he’ is deictic) with 
properties (in this case, the property of being a male who left) and says 
that ‘the propositional information is supplied by the listener applying 
this [property] to some contextually salient individual’ (2014: 294). 
Jacobson thus justifies a non-truth-conditional account of some sen-
tences’ semantics by appealing to a foundational theory of meaning that 
locates its explanatory role within a theory of conversation (if, admit-
tedly, an impressionistic one).
A different sort of approach to some kinds of context-sensitivity has 
grown out of work on anaphoric connections that cross clausal bound-
aries, such as the connections marked by the subscripted indices in 
(5)–(7)6:
(5) a. [A dog]i has been rummaging in the garbage can.
 b. Iti has torn open all the plastic bags.
(6) Every farmer who owns [a donkey]i beats iti.
(7) a. I dropped ten marbles and found all of them, except for onei.
 b. Iti is probably under the sofa.
The anaphoric dependency of the pronouns in (5)–(7) cannot be 
explained by saying that they refer to the same things as their ante-
cedents because there are perfectly good indefinite readings of their 
antecedents on which they cannot be understood as referring to any-
thing—for example, when (5) is uttered on the basis of an inference 
that some dog or other has gotten into the garbage. In some respects, 
these anaphoric pronouns work like variables bound by quantificational 
antecedents, but in these cases, the antecedents are in different clauses, 
and there is no systematic way of translating pairs of sentences like these 
into first-order logic. All of this had begun to puzzle semanticists by 
the late 1970s and gave rise to early dynamic approaches to semantics 
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variously called ‘discourse representation theory’ (Kamp 1981) and ‘file-
change semantics’ (Heim 1982, 1983a), later variants of which have 
become a focus of intensive research.7
I can give a sense of how these theories work by focusing on one of 
Heim’s (1982, 1983a) formulations of her view. She proposes that part 
of the semantic function of indefinite noun phrases is to add new dis-
course referents to the conversational context. The terminology of dis-
course reference, which is due to Kartunnen (1976), can be somewhat 
misleading. As Heim puts it, ‘discourse referents are not referents’; 
they ‘are not individuals and … to establish a discourse referent does 
not necessarily mean to refer to anything’ (1982: 166). Heim treats dis-
course referents as referential indices—mere formal devices whose func-
tion is to keep track of anaphoric relations throughout a conversation 
(which she calls a ‘text’). In effect, they allow for something like varia-
ble-binding across clausal boundaries. At any point in a conversation, 
the context includes a collection of discourse referents and the seman-
tic values of anaphoric pronouns, definite descriptions, and other ‘def-
inites’ are fixed in terms of them. Variations on this idea have become 
highly influential, and discourse reference is now commonly appealed 
to in theories of a wide variety of context-sensitive expressions that are 
not, on their face, anaphoric, including demonstratives (Roberts 2002, 
2003; Stojnic 2016), modals (Roberts 1989, 1996; Stojnic 2016), prop-
ositional anaphora and the at-issue/not-at-issue distinction (Murray 
2014), proper names (Cumming 2007, 2008), and indirect speech acts 
(Asher and Lascarides 2001, 2003; Lepore and Stone 2015). According 
to these theories, manipulating discourse referents is a part of what cer-
tain expressions do in virtue of their linguistic meanings. And this is to 
say that the role of linguistic meaning is (at least in part) to contribute 
to the ongoing conversational context, rather than (merely) to encode 
truth-conditions.
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2  The Truth-Conditional Idealization
If you ask a present-day semanticist Lewis’ question—what does mean-
ing do?—the answer will increasingly be that it does many things and 
that what unites all of the things meaning does is that they must be 
spelled out as part of a broader theory of conversation. If we accept, 
with growing ranks of semanticists, that the communicative turn in 
at least some of its manifestations constitutes progress, then a histori-
cal question becomes puzzling: Why was truth-conditional semantics 
such a dominant research program in the first place? And given that the 
communicative turn has resulted from increased attention to certain 
ubiquitous linguistic phenomena—non-declarative clauses, expressives, 
presupposition, conventional implicature, and context-sensitivity—why 
were not these phenomena attended to during the heyday of truth-con-
ditional semantics?
To answer these questions, we should look to the early twentieth-
century work on logic, mathematics, and philosophy in the context of 
which the methodological toolkit of truth-conditional semantics took 
shape. If the contemporary history of semantics begins with a focus on 
natural language initiated by Davidson and Montague, its prehistory 
played out in the work of logicians, mathematicians, and philosophers 
who focused on formal languages and heavily idealized fragments of 
natural language. I will focus on the three figures from the prehistory 
of contemporary semantics who have had the greatest influence on it: 
Frege, Tarski, and Carnap. To be sure, many other early twentieth-cen-
tury philosophers and mathematicians laid important components of 
the foundation of truth-conditional semantics.8 But no early twentieth-
century figure matches the influence of the three I will discuss.
By the methodological toolkit of truth-conditional semantics, I mean 
a collection of concepts and theoretical tools that are presupposed or 
deployed by mainstream versions of truth-conditional semantics and 
that developed during the prehistoric period. Frege’s contributions are 
perhaps most influential. In particular, his thesis that semantic com-
position is functional application is the most central notion of most 
mainstream work on the syntax-semantics interface—a legacy that is 
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epitomized by the fact that Heim and Kratzer refer to the methodology 
of their influential semantics textbook as ‘the Fregean Program’ (1998: 
chaps. 1–2).9 Along with Russell, Frege is the source of the idea that 
quantifiers are second-order predicates (1893: §22–23). Frege’s sense–
reference distinction is the basis, via its influence on Carnap’s (1947), 
Kripke’s (1963), and Montague’s (1973) intension–extension distinc-
tions, for contemporary work on the semantics of intensional and 
hyperintensional expressions. Most importantly for our purposes, Frege 
is normally credited with the idea that the semantic value of a sentence 
(which Frege identifies with its sense, and the thought it expresses) is 
an entity that can be individuated by its truth-condition (1893: §32). 
Tarski’s most influential contributions to the toolkit are (a) his method 
for constructing axiomatic truth theories for formal languages (1933, 
1944), which was the primary inspiration for Davidson’s truth-theoretic 
semantics, (b) his idea that logical consequence is preservation of truth 
across all uniform reinterpretations of non-logical vocabulary (1936), 
which is the central notion of Montague’s model-theoretic semantics, 
and (c) his treatment of variables and binding in terms of sequences (or 
equivalently, assignment functions) (1933). Carnap put many of Frege’s 
and Tarski’s ideas together, brought them into the philosophical main-
stream, generalized them with his Introduction to Semantics (1941), and 
later laid the mathematical foundations for studying the kind of inten-
sional languages that Montague would place at the center of his meth-
odology (1947).
My aim in this section is to make the case that Frege, Tarski, and 
Carnap worked with heavily idealized notions of language and mean-
ing, and that this idealization was deliberate. I will call the idealization 
in question the ‘truth-conditional idealization’ because it is, in effect, 
an idealization away from all aspects of language and linguistic mean-
ing that present an obstacle to a one-to-one correspondence between 
sentences and truth-conditions. These are the same features of language 
and linguistic meaning that are currently driving the communica-
tive turn: non-declarative clauses, expressive meaning, presupposition, 
conventional implicature, and context-sensitivity.10 Frege, Tarski, and 
Carnap idealized away from these phenomena by limiting their atten-
tion to formalized languages made up of declarative, context-insensitive 
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sentences that possess a single, truth-conditional dimension of signifi-
cance. Their reason for doing this was that none of them was aiming 
primarily at understanding linguistic meaning as it presents itself in nat-
ural language; instead, they had mathematical and philosophical goals 
that required focusing on the bearers of truth-conditions.
In saying that Frege, Tarski, and Carnap idealized away from certain 
features of language and linguistic meaning, I do not mean to suggest 
that they studied idealized versions of natural languages; on the con-
trary, the languages they studied were stipulated constructions. But they 
were languages in the sense that they were constructed in such a way as 
to share some of their central properties—including semantic proper-
ties—with natural languages, and they were idealized in the sense that 
they were constructed so as to share only a carefully selected subset of 
the properties of natural languages. Although it does not make sense to 
say that Frege, Tarski, or Carnap developed idealized models of particu-
lar languages, it does make sense to say that they constructed idealized 
models of language in the abstract.
The truth-conditional idealization is most explicit in Frege’s work. 
Following a long period of Frege scholarship in which Frege’s work on 
language was taken as central to his project (notably in Dummett 1973, 
1994), recent Frege scholars have come to interpret his thought about 
language in terms of his broader aim of understanding the metaphys-
ics and epistemology of mathematics.11 For Frege, the truth-conditional 
idealization is a reflection of his mainly instrumental interest in lan-
guage and meaning, and this can be seen from the combination of two 
facts. First, his concept-script (‘Begriffsschrift ’)—the formal language in 
which his contributions to logic and the foundations of mathematics are 
framed—contains no non-declarative clauses, no context-sensitivity, and 
no mechanisms for capturing presupposition, conventional implicature, 
or expressive aspects of meaning. But second, Frege theorized about all of 
these phenomena in detailed but informal asides about natural language.
The most discussed example of this juxtaposition stems from the fact 
that Frege’s concept-script contains no context-sensitivity, together with 
the fact that his writings include several well-known and influential pas-
sages about tense, indexicality, and other forms of context-sensitivity in 
natural language. In the course of these passages, he makes it clear that 
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natural-language sentences do not express thoughts in a context-inde-
pendent way.
If a time indication is needed by the present tense one must know when 
the sentence was uttered to apprehend the thought correctly. Therefore 
the time of utterance is part of the expression of the thought. If some-
one wants to say the same today as he expressed yesterday using the 
word “today”, he must replace this word with “yesterday”. Although 
the thought is the same its verbal expression must be different so that 
the sense, which would otherwise be affected by the differing times of 
utterance, is readjusted. The case is the same with words like “here” and 
“there”. In all such cases the mere wording, as it is given in writing, is 
not the complete expression of the thought, but the knowledge of cer-
tain accompanying conditions of utterance, which are used as means 
of expressing the thought, are needed for its correct apprehension. The 
pointing of fingers, hand movements, glances may belong here too. The 
same utterance containing the word “I” will express different thoughts in 
the mouths of different men, of which some may be true, others false. 
(1956 [1918]: 296)
Whether these remarks are compatible with the rest of Frege’s theory 
of sense is a matter of debate.12 Frege’s thoughtfulness about context-
sensitivity in natural language is interesting for our purposes because 
it shows that he was well aware of this difference between his concept-
script and natural language. The most lucid explanation of why he 
abstracted away from these distinctions in building his concept-script 
has been offered by Tyler Burge (1979, 1984), who argues that it is a 
mistake to conflate Frege’s notion of sense with linguistic meaning; 
whereas meaning is a property of words, sentences, and other expres-
sion-types, the same expression-type can be used to express different 
senses on different occasions. Burge uses this observation to situate 
Frege’s semantic investigations within his broader theoretical goals.
The basic misunderstanding is the identification of Frege’s notion of Sinn 
(sense) with the notion of linguistic meaning. The misunderstanding is 
an easy one to fall into for two reasons. For one, the term ‘meaning’ has 
always been vague, multi-purposed, and to some extent adaptive to the 
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viewpoint of different theories. Pressing the term into service to charac-
terize Frege’s notion has seemed harmless enough, as long as it is made 
clear that the notion is restricted to an aspect of meaning relevant to fix-
ing the truth value of sentences. A second reason for the misunderstand-
ing has been that Frege did not lavish any considerable attention on the 
area in which the differences between sense and the ordinary notion of 
meaning are clearest—context-dependent reference.
Although the differences between meaning and sense are easiest to notice 
with indexicals (including proper names), the distinction issues from the 
fundamental cast of Frege’s work, a cast discernible throughout his career 
independently of issues about indexicals. Baldly put, Frege was primarily 
interested in the eternal structure of thought, of cognitive contents, not 
in conventional linguistic meaning. He pursued this interest by investi-
gating the structure of language, and much of his work may be seen as 
directly relevant to theories of linguistic meaning. But the epistemic ori-
entation of his theorizing leads to a notion of sense with a different theo-
retical function from modern notions of meaning. (Burge 1979: 213)
As Burge says elsewhere, none of the explanatory roles that Frege assigns 
to his notion of sense ‘is logically equivalent to, or even extensionally 
coincident with, conventional significance (or with linguistic meaning, 
unless the relevant language were, unlike actual natural languages, ideal 
for expressing thought)’ (1984: 455). But Frege’s goal in designing his 
concept-script was precisely to create a language ‘ideal for expressing 
thought’—a transparent medium for examining the bearers of truth and 
falsity by placing them in one-to-one correspondence with sentences. 
And so the conflation of linguistic meaning with sense as those notions 
apply to Frege’s own work is an easy mistake to make.13
I agree with the spirit of Burge’s reading, but his view that ‘context-
dependent reference’ is ‘the area in which the differences between sense 
and the ordinary notion of meaning are clearest’ undersells a broader 
point. In fact, Frege recognized and discussed but deliberately ideal-
ized away from several other dimensions of linguistic meaning that 
were irrelevant to his broader explanatory goals. In ‘Über Sinn und 
Bedeutung,’ for example, Frege explicitly restricts many of his claims 
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about linguistic meaning to declarative sentences (‘Behauptungssätze ’), 
but he also includes two paragraphs on clauses of other types14:
A subordinate clause with ‘that’ after ‘command’, ‘ask’, ‘forbid’, would 
appear in direct speech as an imperative. Such a clause has no reference 
but only a sense. A command, a request, are indeed not thoughts, yet 
they stand on the same level as thoughts. Hence in subordinate clauses 
depending upon ‘command’, ‘ask’, etc., words have their indirect refer-
ence. The reference of such a clause is therefore not a truth value but a 
command, a request, and so forth.
The case is similar for the dependent question in phrases such as ‘doubt 
whether’, ‘not to know what’. It is easy to see that here also the words are 
to be taken to have their indirect reference. Dependent clauses express-
ing questions and beginning with ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘where’, ‘when’, ‘how’, 
‘by what means’, etc., seem at times to approximate very closely to adver-
bial clauses in which words have their customary references. These cases 
are distinguished linguistically [in German] by the mood of the verb. 
With the subjunctive, we have a dependent question and indirect refer-
ence of the words, so that a proper name cannot in general be replaced by 
another name of the same object. (1892a: 33–34)
I am not optimistic that Frege’s ideas about non-declaratives could be 
incorporated into an adequate semantic theory, but they demonstrate 
that the absence of non-declaratives in the concept-script was no over-
sight, and they give us good evidence about Frege’s reasons for restrict-
ing his language to declaratives. Frege was not merely interested in the 
thoughts expressed by sentences; he wished his concept-script to be a 
language whose sentences all expressed thoughts with truth-values, even 
going so far as to construct a proof that each sentence of the concept-
script has a Bedeutung (1893: §10). Elsewhere, Frege remarks that logic 
‘has much the same relation to truth as physics has to weight or heat’ 
and that ‘it falls to logic to discern the laws of truth’ (1956 [1918]: 
289). Frege’s concept-script was the medium he devised for this dis-
cernment, and the truth-conditional idealization was a means to this 
end. Including non-declaratives, which he took to have sense but no 
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reference (and so no truth-values), would have been pointless given his 
logical aims.
Although he idealizes away non-declaratives, Frege is unusual among 
early twentieth-century logicians in that he does reserve a place for what 
we might call the illocutionary dimension of linguistic meaning—the 
dimension encoded in natural language, at least in part, by clause-
type—in his concept-script. He does so in the form of the vertical judg-
ment stroke that begins each well-formed statement. Quoting Frege 
(1891), Burge explains the function of the judgment stroke as follows.
The result of attaching the judgment stroke to a sentential expression, 
begun by the horizontal, asserts something, but is not a term: ‘The judg-
ment stroke cannot be used to construct a functional expression; for it 
does not serve, in conjunction with other signs, to designate an object: 
‘˫2 + 3 = 5’ does not designate anything; it asserts something’. (Burge 
1986: 113)
The judgment stroke is interesting for present purposes because it dem-
onstrates that Frege took the illocutionary dimension of meaning rep-
resented by it (whatever that dimension is) to be irreducible to both 
sense and reference—a point made famous by Geach (1965). Although 
this illocutionary dimension of meaning does make its way into Frege’s 
concept-script, there are at least two respects in which its treatment is 
idealized. First, as I have already shown, Frege’s views about non-declar-
atives are confined to his informal remarks about natural language; the 
only symbol carrying illocutionary meaning in his concept-script corre-
sponds to assertion. Second, in moving the features of his sentences that 
carry illocutionary meaning all the way over to the left, outside their 
sense-bearing clause, what Frege leaves in their place is a kind of proto-
sentence from which all illocutionary meaning has been stripped—what 
contemporary semanticists sometimes call a ‘sentence radical.’15 This 
makes it possible to isolate a clausal component of every sentence of the 
concept-script that has all of the semantic hallmarks of the sentences 
studied by truth-conditional semanticists in two significant respects: 
(i) the sentence-radical’s sense is coincident with its truth-conditional 
content, and (ii) its sense composes solely from the senses of its parts.
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Frege is also typically cited as the originator of the idea of presupposi-
tion (Beaver and Geurts 2011: §4.1; Soames 1989: 75). Frege argues 
that every singular term triggers the presupposition that its referent 
exists (1891, 1892a, b)—an idea that has continued to exert a major 
influence, particularly in discussions of definite descriptions (Strawson 
1950; Heim and Kratzer 1998; Elbourne 2013). In addition to this pre-
suppositional dimension of meaning, Frege also discusses a dimension 
he calls ‘coloring’ (‘Färbung ’), which, he makes clear, is a dimension 
that is independent of both sense and reference (1892a, 1918). Some 
of his examples, such as the distinction he draws between the coloring 
of ‘and,’ ‘although,’ ‘but,’ and ‘yet,’ prefigure later discussions of conven-
tional implicature by Grice and others and have been explicitly cited by 
some as the origin of that notion (Bach 1999a: 329–330; Neale 1999). 
Other examples, such as Frege’s claim that ‘dog’ (‘Hund ’) and ‘cur’ 
(‘Köter ’), differ only in coloring, prefigure applications of the notion of 
expressive meaning to slurs and other pejorative expressions (Jeshion 
2013; Potts 2005; Williamson 2009), and have been cited as an explicit 
precursor to some notions of expressive meaning (e.g., Potts 2007: 
§2.2). Like context-sensitivity and non-declaratives, presupposition and 
coloring show up only in Frege’s brief discussions of natural language 
(1891, 1892a, b, 1918); the notions play no role in the concept-script. 
The explanation for their absence is clear and parallels Frege’s reasons 
for leaving out context-sensitivity and non-declaratives: including pre-
supposition or coloring in his formal language would pollute the trans-
parent medium for truth-valued thoughts that Frege sought to create. 
Thus, whereas uttering an expression in natural language involves pre-
supposing that the expression has a Bedeutung, according to Frege, he 
offers a proof that each expression of the concept-script possesses a 
Bedeutung (1893: §10; see also Heck 2012: chap. 4), thus ensuring the 
transparency of his medium for thoughts. It follows, as Joan Weiner 
puts it, that ‘a logically perfect language requires no presuppositions’ 
(1997a: 262). Similar points obviously go for conventional implicature 
and expressive meaning: those aspects of linguistic meaning do nothing 
to ensure the intimate, bijective relation between sentences and truth-
valued thoughts that Frege wished to ensure—and they could poten-
tially get in the way—and so he left them out of the picture.
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Frege’s idealization away from all aspects of language and linguistic 
meaning that were not relevant to studying thoughts qua the bearers 
of truth is the most fully-articulated and clearly self-conscious instance 
of the truth-conditional idealization. Neither Tarski nor Carnap was as 
explicit in their adoption of the idealization, as explicit about their rea-
sons for adopting it, or as precise about the various aspects of language 
and meaning away from which they were idealizing. We nonetheless 
find evidence of the same idealization peppered throughout their writ-
ings, in the overall picture of their semantic theorizing and in one of the 
covering terms that have often been used to group them together—‘the 
ideal language tradition.’16
In a slogan, those in the ideal language tradition shared an ambi-
tion to design languages that were better suited to their mathemati-
cal, logical, and scientific pursuits. They took natural languages to be 
defective for these purposes for a variety of reasons: natural languages’ 
sentence structures and vocabulary do not adequately reflect the struc-
ture of reality (Russell 1918), ‘the words of everyday life are not suffi-
ciently abstract’ for expressing scientific claims without saying too much 
(Russell 1931: 82), and so on. But at least one of their reasons for focus-
ing on artificial languages was to avoid the complications raised by the 
aspects of meaning that later came to fuel the communicative turn.
In outlining his theory of truth, Tarski restricts its applicability to 
formal languages only (1933: §7). He makes it explicit, moreover, that 
truth can be defined only for object languages whose sentences are all 
declarative, and he takes sentences themselves to be the bearers of truth 
and falsity (Tarski 1944: §2). Tarski was famously pessimistic about the 
possibility of defining truth in natural languages:
the very possibility of a consistent use of the expression ‘true sentence’ 
which is in harmony with the laws of logic and the spirit of everyday lan-
guage seems to be very questionable, and consequently the same doubt 
attaches to the possibility of constructing a correct definition of this 
expression. (Tarski 1933: 165)
Tarski’s pessimism was due, at least in part, to the ease and fre-
quency with which semantic paradoxes crop up in natural language. 
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His solution was to restrict his method for defining truth to formal lan-
guages with restricted expressive power. The most crucial such restric-
tion is the exclusion of each language’s sentences from the extension of 
its own truth predicate, so that truth can be defined for each language 
only by positing a hierarchy of object languages and metalanguages. But 
it is also noteworthy in this connection that Tarski’s formal languages 
lack context-sensitive expressions. The semantic paradoxes are often for-
mulated in natural language using indexicals, and Tarski formulates the 
liar paradox using demonstratives in both his 1933 essay (158: ‘…the 
sentence printed on this page…’) and his 1944 essay (347: ‘The sen-
tence printed in this paper on p. 347, 1. 31, is not true’). Moreover, 
Tarski initially characterizes formalized languages as ‘artificially con-
structed languages in which the sense of every expression is unam-
biguously determined by its form’ (1933: 165–166), thus ruling out 
the possibility of formalized languages containing context-sensitive 
expressions.17
Like Frege, Tarksi’s aim was not primarily to understand linguistic 
meaning—and particularly not in natural language. He constructed 
and studied artificial languages and developed semantic tools to better 
understand those languages, but these pursuits were in the service of 
broader mathematical goals, including accounts of truth, definition, and 
logical consequence that were rigorous enough for mathematical use. As 
John Burgess puts it, ‘it was not linguistic understanding but mathe-
matical fruitfulness that Tarski sought with his definition [of truth], and 
in this he was very successful’ (2008: 154–155). This point even applies 
to Tarski’s use of the word ‘semantic’ to describe his theory of truth. He 
used this label not because he thought that his theory of truth could 
constitute or lay the foundation for a theory of meaning (much less a 
theory of meaning in natural language), but because it involves defining 
truth in semantic terms.
it turns out that the simplest way of obtaining an exact definition of 
truth is one which involves the use of other semantic notions, e.g., the 
notion of satisfaction. It is for this reason that we count the concept of 
truth which is discussed here among the concepts of semantics, and the 
problem of defining truth proves to be closely related to the more general 
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problem of setting up the foundations of theoretical semantics. (Tarski 
1944: §5)
But although some semantic notions are needed to define truth in 
Tarski’s way, these notions are rather limited. Tarski was interested in 
sentences qua bearers of truth and falsity and relata of the consequence 
relation, and so all sentences and semantic features of sentences not rel-
evant to these pursuits were irrelevant to his aims.
When Carnap came to embrace semantics under Tarski’s influence, 
he adopted many the same idealizations. In §5 of his Introduction 
to Semantics, Carnap makes it clear that he is interested only in ‘pure 
semantics,’ which he describes as the stipulative ‘construction and 
analysis of a semantical system’—an inquiry he contrasts with ‘descrip-
tive semantics,’ which he characterizes as ‘the description and analysis 
of the semantical features either of some particular historically given 
language, e.g. French, or of all historically given languages in general’ 
(1941: 11–12). ‘Our discussions apply only to declarative sentences,’ 
Carnap continues, ‘leaving aside all sentences of other kinds, e.g. ques-
tions, imperatives, etc.; and hence only to language systems (semantical 
systems) consisting of declarative sentences’ (1941: 14–15). Though he 
goes on to admit that ‘not much work has been done so far in the logi-
cal analysis of other than declarative sentences,’ he cites a range of work 
of which he is aware (1941: 15). Carnap does not discuss context-sensi-
tivity or the other features I have discussed, but the formal languages he 
constructs lack these features.
What are Carnap’s reasons for idealizing? Helpfully, he includes a list 
of applications of semantics in §38, arguing that its study results in a 
better understanding of the propositional calculus (§38b), of the distinc-
tion between logical and non-logical vocabulary (§38c), of the distinc-
tion between extensional and non-extensional languages (§38d; see also 
Carnap 1947), of the diagnoses and potential solutions to the semantic 
paradoxes (§38e), of proof theory (§38f ), of various philosophically and 
mathematically useful notions that had previously been regarded with 
suspicion, including truth, probability, and confirmation (§38g), and of 
a variety of problems (and pseudo-problems) in epistemology, the phi-
losophy of science, and the empirical sciences (§38h–i, §39). What these 
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applications have in common is that—at least according to Carnap—
they are all best pursued via pure semantics in his sense. Although it is 
clear from his discussion of descriptive semantics in Sect. 5 that Carnap 
takes the empirical study of semantic features of natural languages to 
be worthwhile, its pursuit not included among his own explicitly stated 
aims. Since Carnap takes pure semantics to be a wholly analytic pursuit 
and descriptive semantics to be an empirical one (1941: §5), it is unclear 
what, if any bearing he would have taken the results of the former to 
have on the latter.
3  The Pivot
The event that demarcates the history of contemporary semantics from 
its prehistory was a pivot from one diverse collection of explanatory 
goals to a very different one. What went under the name ‘semantics’ 
prior to this pivot was a set of tools used to pursue logical, mathemati-
cal, and philosophical projects. The contemporary history of semantics 
began with a shift to the goal of empirically investigating natural lan-
guage by showing how the semantic properties of sentences systemat-
ically depend on their structures and the semantic properties of their 
component expressions. The key to my narrative is that this discontinu-
ity in explanatory goals was masked by a continuity in methodological 
assumptions.
The historical moment at which I am locating this pivot was not, of 
course, the first time anyone took an interest in the empirical study of 
meaning in natural language. My focus is aimed at the beginnings of a 
relatively coherent research program that established itself among phi-
losophers and linguists in the 1970s and that continues as going con-
cern in most philosophy and linguistics departments today.18 Davidson 
and Montague are the founders of this research program.
Among the central aims of Davidson’s influential early papers on 
semantics were (a) to overcome Tarski’s skepticism about the pos-
sibility of applying his tools to the study of natural language and (b) 
to argue that such an application of Tarski’s tools could ‘do duty’ 
as a theory of meaning for natural language (1967a, 1970a, 1973). 
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Davidson recognized that his proposals differed from Tarski’s in several 
key ways; since his goal was not to define truth in a formal language, 
but rather to use a primitive notion of truth to construct an axiomatic 
theory that could stand in as a theory of meaning, Davidson could not 
take semantic notions such as the synonymy of object language and 
metalanguage expressions for granted, as Tarski had. He marked this 
distinction subtly, by describing his project as that of giving ‘truth theo-
ries’ as opposed to Tarski’s ‘truth definitions.’ Still, Davidson made free 
use of the adjective ‘Tarski-style’ to describe his project (e.g., 1984: xv), 
and the details of his methodology are borrowed directly from Tarski’s 
playbook: construct an axiomatic theory that assigns satisfaction condi-
tions to predicates (and, in Davidson’s case, referents to singular terms), 
and that deductively generates a T-sentence for every sentence of the 
object language. But as John Burgess has masterfully argued in his essay, 
‘Tarski’s Tort,’ the analogy drawn by Davidson and others between his 
project and Tarski’s is misleading; even the idea that Davidson’s and 
Tarski’s projects can be described as ‘semantics’ in anything like the 
same sense rests on a serious equivocation, given their fundamentally 
opposite explanatory goals.
the invocation of Tarski’s name was not entirely appropriate, since as 
Davidson, if not every one of his disciples, was aware, those conjectures 
amount to an inversion of Tarski. For they make what for Tarski were 
clauses in a definition of truth in terms of already understood notions 
like negation and conjunction and disjunction, into definitions of a kind 
of those operators, in terms of a notion of truth taken as primitive. We 
constantly find in the writings of Davidson and disciples mentions of a 
‘‘Tarskian’’ theory of truth, where ‘‘counter-Tarskian’’ or ‘‘anti-Tarskian’’ 
would have been more accurate, if less likely to confer borrowed prestige 
on bold (which is to say doubtful) new conjectures. And Tarski, of course, 
is not responsible for this usage. (Burgess 2008: 166)
Although Davidson adopted the details of Tarski’s methodology, he 
employed it for ‘counter-Tarskian’ ends: his goal was the empirical 
investigation of natural language rather than the mathematical inves-
tigation of formal languages, and each project took as primitives the 
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concepts that the other aimed to elucidate. In Carnap’s terminology, 
Davidson’s aim was to pursue descriptive semantics using the tools of 
pure semantics.
A similar story can be told about Montague, who was Tarski’s former 
Ph.D. student and Carnap’s colleague at the time when he began devel-
oping his proposals about natural-language semantics. Montague began 
his 1970 manifesto, ‘English as a Formal Language,’ by boldly stating 
that he proposes to pursue natural-language semantics in exactly the 
same model-theoretic way that Tarski (1936) had pursued the project of 
defining logical truth, as extended by Carnap (1947) and Kripke (1963) 
for intensional languages.
I reject the contention that an important theoretical difference exists 
between formal and natural languages…. Like Donald Davidson, I regard 
the construction of a theory of truth—or rather, of the more general 
notion of truth under an arbitrary interpretation—as the basic goal of 
serious syntax and semantics … (1970a: 222)
This famous claim amounts to a denial of Carnap’s distinction between 
pure and descriptive semantics and has the corollary that pure seman-
tics is equally appropriate for the empirical study of meaning in natural 
language.
Truth-conditional semantics was thus conceived around the idea that 
natural-language semantics should be pursued using the same meth-
odological toolkit that Frege, Tarski, and Carnap developed for better 
understanding formal languages, but with the key difference that now 
that toolkit was being wielded with the radically different goal of empir-
ically investigating natural language. A crucial aspect of Davidson’s and 
Montague’s adoption of this methodological toolkit, for my purposes, 
is that they took up the truth-conditional idealization along with it. 
According to both Davidson and Montague, as well as the truth-con-
ditional semanticists who followed them, the task of a semantic theory 
was to assign each meaningful sentence of the object language a sin-
gle truth-condition. This could be made to look like a good idea only 
because all non-truth-conditional aspects of linguistic meaning were ini-
tially idealized away, and because the fragments of English they began 
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with were maximally similar to the formal language previously studied. 
This is my explanation of why contemporary natural-language seman-
tics began as truth-conditional semantics. With this historical back-
ground in place, we can recognize the communicative turn as a slow 
attempt to lift the truth-conditional idealization.
A short digression on the nature of idealization will be helpful here; 
I will adopt Michael Weisberg’s (2007) taxonomy of kinds of idealiza-
tion in what follows. Weisberg defines idealization as ‘the intentional 
introduction of distortion into scientific theories’ (2007: 639). This is 
a practice that may be more or less legitimate, depending in part on the 
explanatory purpose to which an idealization is put. In the hands of 
Frege, Tarski, and Carnap, the truth-conditional idealization distorted 
the notion of linguistic meaning in a way that was legitimate because 
linguistic meaning was not the object of their inquiries, and because 
idealizing helped them to achieve their other goals. But once Davidson 
and Montague took up the goal of empirically investigating meaning 
in natural language, the truth-conditional idealization constituted a 
distortion in the very subject-matter they sought to understand. With 
the transition from prehistorical to historical concerns, the truth-condi-
tional idealization became a fundamentally different sort of thing.
In Weisberg’s helpful terminology, Frege, Tarski, and Carnap can best 
be construed as aiming at minimalist idealizations of the semantic prop-
erties they studied.
Minimalist idealization is the practice of constructing and studying theo-
retical models that include only the core causal factors which give rise to 
a phenomenon. Such a representation is often called a minimal model of 
the phenomenon. Put more explicitly, a minimalist model contains only 
those factors that make a difference to the occurrence and essential char-
acter of the phenomenon in question. (2007: 642)
Weisberg illustrates the notion of a minimal model with the example of 
Boyle’s Law, which he borrows from Strevens (2004):
In explaining Boyle’s law … theorists often introduce the assumption that 
gas molecules do not collide with each other. This assumption is false; 
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collisions do occur in low-pressure gases. However, low-pressure gases 
behave as if there were no collisions. This means that collisions make 
no difference to the phenomenon and are not included in the canonical 
explanation. Theorists’ explicit introduction of the no-collision assump-
tion is a way of asserting that collisions are actually irrelevant and make 
no difference. (Weisberg 2007: 643)
Frege, Tarski, and Carnap constructed minimal models of language that 
‘contained only those factors that make a difference to the occurrence 
and essential character of the’ logical, mathematical, and philosophi-
cal phenomena that were in question for them. Of course, the factors 
of the phenomena in which they were interested were not causal—they 
were abstract and mathematical—but I think it makes sense to say 
that their idealized models of language were minimal in a sense that is 
closely related to Weisberg’s definition. Moreover, since their models did 
not distort the things they were trying to study and since the distorted 
ideas about the nature of linguistic meaning that arose from—or were 
inspired by—their investigations were ‘false but nondifference-making’ 
given their purposes (Weisberg 2007: 643), their uses of the truth-con-
ditional idealization were legitimate.
This was no longer true once ‘semantics’ became the study of mean-
ing in natural language. It then became imperative that the truth-
conditional idealization could eventually be lifted—that detailed 
compositional accounts of non-declaratives, context-sensitivity, 
expressives, presupposition, and conventional implicature could be 
given—lest the idealization turns out to be a mere distortion. The only 
charitable interpretation of the truth-conditional idealization in this 
context would identify it, again using Weisberg’s terminology, as a 
Galilean idealization—a distortion introduced into a theory in order to 
make its subject-matter tractable (2007: 640). The idea of a Galilean 
idealization is to begin one’s model of a phenomenon by including only 
some central features that one has the theoretical or computational 
resources to understand at present and to reintroduce other features 
and the complexities they raise later, when new resources become avail-
able. A physical model of projectile motion might begin by idealizing 
away from air resistance, for example, because factoring it in would 
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complicate things in initially difficult-to-calculate ways. But air resistance 
would eventually have to be reintroduced into the model in order for it 
to yield useful empirical predictions. In the history of natural-language 
semantics, the initial focus on a single, truth-conditional dimension of 
linguistic meaning might be defended as the initial stage of this pro-
cess—focusing on the fragments of natural language and the dimension 
of linguistic meaning that were understandable in terms of the theoreti-
cal tools then available.
If the truth-conditional idealization is best thought of as a Galilean 
idealization in the early history of contemporary semantics, then the 
subsequent history suggests that it was a misguided starting place. We 
saw one reason for thinking so in Sect. 1: the central foundational 
assumption with which contemporary semantics began—that the role 
of sentence meaning is to determine a truth-condition—has gradually 
been abandoned in favor of pluralistic, communication-focused concep-
tions of linguistic meaning. In other words, lifting the idealization has 
required radically rethinking the nature of the thing being studied.
The truth-conditional idealization has also played a role in delaying 
the progress of semantics, in part because it has sometimes been treated 
as an unshakable methodological tenet rather than as a temporary, 
Galilean idealization that must eventually be lifted. A common stance on 
non-truth-conditional dimensions of meaning among truth-conditional 
semanticists who have resisted the communicative turn has been a mix-
ture of silence and dismissiveness. This dismissiveness has often taken 
the form of the slogan that if it is not part of a sentence’s truth-condi-
tion, it must be pragmatic rather than semantic.19 This slogan begs the 
question against the very possibility of non-truth-conditional dimen-
sions of meaning. The dismissive approach is also often paired with a 
vague and unsystematic idea of pragmatics, making it a sort of waste 
bin for whatever does not fit into truth-conditional semantic explana-
tion (Bach 1999b).
The truth-conditional idealization has also had a deleterious effect 
on semantics by leading to an overly thorough exploration of blind 
alleys. The history of semantics is littered with ill-fated attempts to 
shoehorn non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning into truth-con-
ditional frameworks. Perhaps the most blatant examples of this were 
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the various attempts by truth-conditional semanticists to reduce non-
declarative clauses or their semantic values to their declarative counter-
parts. Davidson argued that uttering a non-declarative is tantamount 
to making two assertions (1979), for example, and Lewis argued that 
each non-declarative is semantically equivalent to an explicit performa-
tive sentence (1970). This kind of declarative-reductionism is no longer 
popular among semanticists—see Starr (2014) for some of the rea-
sons—but it is easy to see the view’s pull for someone who has mistaken 
the truth-conditional idealization for ideology.
Montague’s own brief remarks about non-declaratives are more puz-
zling, in part because they seem to be mutually inconsistent, and in part 
because his views seemed to be evolving at the time of his early death. 
In ‘Universal Grammar,’ which was presented in December 1969 and 
February 1970 and published in 1970, Montague makes one puzzling 
remark that alludes to the existence of non-declarative clauses:
The basic aim of semantics is to characterize the notions of a true sen-
tence (under a given interpretation) and of entailment, while that of syn-
tax is to characterize the various syntactical categories, especially the set of 
declarative sentences. … I fail to see any great interest in syntax except as 
a preliminary to semantics. (1970b: 223, fn. 2)
It is very difficult to make sense of Montague’s claim that semantics 
should be ‘especially’ concerned with declarative sentences, since it pre-
supposes (a) that semantics should not be totally unconcerned with 
non-declaratives, but (b) that it should pay less attention to them. One 
possible interpretation of this passage would take Montague to be sug-
gesting that all sentences, including those which seem on the surface to 
be non-declarative, are syntactically declarative at an underlying level of 
logical form (cf. Sadock 1974). But this reading is difficult to square 
with Montague’s claim that semantics is concerned ‘especially’ (rather 
than exclusively) with declaratives.20 We might instead read Montague 
as saying that we should be especially concerned with declaratives for 
now—that we should worry about non-declaratives later. On this 
reading, he is proposing a Galilean idealization. Given Montague’s 
claim that the ‘basic aim of semantics’ is to assign model-theoretic 
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truth-conditions to sentences, this reading requires assuming that 
Montague took non-declaratives to have semantic values of the same, 
truth-condition-bearing type as declaratives. But again, it is difficult to 
square this assumption with his use of ‘especially,’ since if non-declar-
atives possess semantic values of the same type as declaratives; it is 
unclear why they would be any less interesting from the point of view 
of Montague’s version of semantics. It is tempting to think that this pas-
sage reveals a deep tension in Montague’s original assumptions and that 
his commitment to the truth-conditional idealization was not entirely 
deliberate and reflective.
Another possible understanding of Montague’s place in the history of 
natural-language semantics is suggested by a brief remark in ‘The Proper 
Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English,’ which he presented 
in September 1970 and which was published posthumously in 1973. 
There Montague seems to explicitly recognize the Galilean nature of the 
truth-conditional idealization and briefly anticipates later ideas about 
non-declaratives that would fuel the communicative turn:
when only declarative sentences come into consideration, it is the con-
struction of [truth and entailment conditions] that … should count as 
the central concern of syntax and semantics. [footnote: In connection 
with imperatives and interrogatives truth and entailment conditions 
are of course inappropriate, and would be replaced by fulfilment condi-
tions and a characterization of the semantic content of a correct answer.] 
(Montague 1973: 18)
This was Montague’s last chance to develop his ideas on the matter; 
he died in March 1971, six months after presenting this paper. Most 
mainstream work in semantics during the 1970s would fail to take 
heed of his anticipatory footnote, and the truth-conditional idealiza-
tion, which Montague had seemingly begun to recognize as such, hard-
ened into ideology until it was shaken loose in the following decades. 
The best evidence of this hardening comes from early introductions to 
Montague semantics, in which no attention is given to non-declarative 
clauses or non-truth-conditional dimensions of meaning, and in which 
the Montagovian project is presented as essentially truth-conditional 
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(e.g., Dowty et al. 1981; Partee 1975; Thomason 1974).21 All of this 
makes it tempting to think of Montague not simply as one of the two 
founders of natural-language semantics, but as someone who straddled 
the boundary between its prehistory and its history. He began study-
ing natural language with something like the same explanatory goals as 
his forebears—to define truth-in-an-interpretation and entailment—
only now in formal systems that mirrored much more of the complex-
ity of natural language. At this stage, the truth-conditional idealization 
was, for Montague, still a minimal idealization. But the footnote in 
Montague 1973 suggests that he may have begun, in his last months, 
to reconceive of the truth-conditional idealization as a Galilean one, 
and of his project as the empirical investigation of meaning in natural 
language. And although semanticists of the 1970s took up Montague’s 
work in an empirically oriented spirit, thus committing themselves to a 
Galilean version of the truth-conditional idealization, they did not, in 
general, seem to have appreciated that the need to lift the idealization 
would falsify some of their most basic foundational claims.
Although the communicative turn constitutes a revolutionary 
rethinking of the nature of linguistic meaning, it is important to rec-
ognize that it has been a gradual and bloodless revolution and one that 
has been embodied by many small adjustments in the methodology of 
semantics. Moreover, this methodology has exhibited enough continuity 
that some semanticists who have participated in the revolution still think 
of themselves as doing Montague-style semantics. Thus, Martin Stokhof, 
whose work on dynamic semantics makes him a key revolutionary, 
places his own work within a Montagovian tradition by ignoring its 
truth-conditional aspects—one of its crucial ingredients according to its 
early practitioners (e.g., Dowty et al. 1981: chap. 1)—and emphasizing 
instead its model-theoretic formulation and its conception of the syntax–
semantics interface (Stokhof 2006; see also Partee 2012). We might even 
hypothesize that since Lewis’ immediate goal in linking sentence mean-
ings with truth-conditions was to debunk the structuralist approach to 
semantics, which had been proposed by Katz and Postal (1964) and 
initially endorsed by Chomsky (1965), we should take Lewis’ broader 
point to have been that semantics involves the kind of word–world 
connections that are still embodied in its post-communicative-turn 
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forms. Given these continuities, we might wonder, wherein lies the 
revolution?22
The answer, I think, is that although the recent history of semantics 
may look from within like a series of gradual adjustments to a single, 
continuous model-theoretic framework driven by an expanding collec-
tion of data, the framework that has resulted from these adjustments 
embodies a very different answer to one of the central foundational 
questions that semantics was originally designed to answer: What is lin-
guistic meaning? The semantics of the 1970s embodied and espoused a 
truth-condition-centric answer to this question; today’s semantics has 
turned to communication-centric answers. Moreover, the earlier answer 
to this question shaped semantic practice in ways that led to delayed 
progress and wrong turns on the ground, and so the issue is not of 
merely philosophical interest.
I am therefore led to believe that the role of the truth-conditional 
idealization in the early history of natural-language semantics embodied 
a confusion—one that resulted from an insufficiently critical adoption 
of the methodology of prehistoric figures, including Frege, Tarski, and 
Carnap. What fascinates me about this confusion is that Frege, Tarski, 
and Carnap themselves did not suffer from it, and this is because they 
understood the nature of the truth-conditional idealization, its pur-
poses, and its limitations.
Notes
 1. Following Lewis (1980), I use ‘semantic value’ as a theory-neutral 
term for the property of an expression or the entity associated with an 
expression that (a) combines with other expressions’ semantic values via 
semantic composition rules and (b) is the output of the semantic com-
position of the semantic values of the expression’s parts (if the expres-
sion is complex). This is the most central notion of linguistic meaning 
for the purposes of compositional semantics.
 2. A possible exception is Pauline Jacobson’s recent textbook on variable-
free semantics (2014); I will say more about her views later in this 
section.
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 3. Some have denied this premise (e.g., Lewis 1970; Davidson 1979); 
I will discuss them in Sect. 3.
 4. I cite Roberts and Portner as two of the most influential contributors 
to a growing movement. For another influential approach that is rel-
evantly similar to Roberts’ questions-under-discussion framework, see 
Ciardelli et al. (2013); for relevantly similar alternatives to Portner’s 
proposal, see Charlow (2014), Kaufmann (2012), Lewis (1975b), and 
Starr (ms).
 5. For extensive discussions of cases of open-ended semantic underspeci-
fication, see Bach (1987), Carston (2002), Neale (2004), Sperber and 
Wilson (1994/1986).
 6. These examples and my discussion of them are a highly compressed 
summary of some of the arguments found in Heim (1982: chap. 1).
 7. Influential dynamic approaches to anaphora include Chierchia (1995), 
Geurts (1999), Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991a, b), Kamp and Reyle 
(1993), and Roberts (1989, 1996).
 8. Bertrand Russell’s ideas about descriptions, logical form, and structured 
propositions (1903, 1905, 1918) have been influential, for example, as 
were Saul Kripke’s (1963) work on modal logic, Alonzo Church’s work 
on the lambda calculus (1941), Arthur Prior’s work on temporal logic 
(1957, 1967, 1968), and Andrzej Mostowski’s work on quantifiers 
(1957). Moreover, there is a sense in which the prehistory of semantics 
continued after the history of semantics began, as work on formal lan-
guages has continued to influence natural-language semantics through-
out the latter’s development.
 9. Although Frege took referents (Bedeutungen ) to compose by functional 
application, it is controversial whether he thought the same about 
senses, and many commentators argue that he took the sense of a word 
and the sense of a complex expression of which the word is a part to 
stand in a part–whole relation (e.g., Dummett 1991: 176, 1996: 192; 
see also Levine 2002 and Mendelsohn 2005: §5.1).
 10. I do not mean to suggest that these are the only features of natural 
language away from which Frege, Tarski, and Carnap idealized in their 
investigations of language; we could also add vagueness, ambiguity, 
non-referring singular terms, many complex syntactic structures, and 
so on.
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 11. Important contributors to this reassessment of Frege include Burge 
(1979, 1984a, 1986, 1992), Gabriel (1996), Ricketts (1986), Simons 
(1992), Taschek (1992), Weiner (1990, 1997a, b).
 12. See, e.g., Evans (1982) for an attempt to construct a Fregean (or neo-
Fregean) theory of context-sensitivity, and Kaplan (1989a) and Perry 
(1977) for influential criticisms.
 13. Although Burge’s point is couched in his Platonist reading of Frege’s 
metaphysics (see Burge 1992), my point would be equally safe in the 
hands of those who read Frege as an anti-Platonist. Joan Weiner has 
consistently pointed out that Frege’s primary aims were epistemologi-
cal, for example, and that this is why his Begriffsschrift does not deal 
in any ‘features of language that are [not] exhausted by logical laws’ 
(1997a: 249; see also 1997b).
 14. In ‘The Thought’ (1956 [1918]: 293–294), Frege’s views on interroga-
tives shifts somewhat. There he argues that ‘word questions’ (i.e., wh-
questions), like predicates, express unsaturated senses, whereas ‘sentence 
questions’ (i.e., polar questions) express the senses as their indicative 
counterparts, but that their function is ‘to express a thought without 
laying it down as true.’
 15. The practice of factoring clauses into mood-markers and sentence-rad-
icals is quite common in contemporary work on the semantics of non-
declaratives, see, e.g., Charlow (2014), Davidson (1979), Grice (1968), 
Lewis (1970), Starr (ms).
 16. This label extends to other figures, including Russell, early 
Wittgenstein, the logical positivists, and to some extent also Quine. If 
I had more space, I would devote some of it to saying how versions of 
the truth-conditional idealization play out in these figures’ work, and 
how they influenced the early history of natural-language semantics—
issues that are quite subtle. I leave them out because they had less of 
a direct impact on truth-conditional semantics than Frege, Tarski, and 
Carnap.
 17. Patterson locates Tarski’s idealization away from indexicality within a 
tradition of earlier Polish logicians treating indexicals as defects of nat-
ural language because they violated the principle that ‘two sentences 
which have the same form always mean the same’ (Kotarbiński 1966: 
22, quoted by Patterson 2012: 59).
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 18. A brief history of this research program is told by Partee (2004: chap. 
1), who played a central role in establishing it, particularly among 
linguists.
 19. Variations on this slogan can be found in Blackburn (1987: 52); 
Cappelen and Lepore (2005).
 20. It is also worth noting that syntactically loaded versions of declarative 
reductionism require positing transformations between surface syntax 
and whichever level of representation is relevant to semantic interpre-
tation. This does not sit well with Montague’s directly compositional 
approach to the syntax-semantics interface, according to which seman-
tic interpretation is not ‘“ postponed” until a later stage in the gram-
matical computation’ (Barker and Jacobson 2007: 2).
 21. A caveat: several papers on non-truth-conditional phenomena that 
would later influence the communicative turn were published in the 
1970s. But citation data suggest that they did not become influential 
at the time. A clear example is C.L. Hamblin’s ‘Questions in Montague 
English’ (1973, anthologized in Partee 1976), which is now regarded 
as a modern classic, with 1240 citations, but which had received 
only 31, 70, and 275 citations by the end of its first three decades, 
respectively, the rest coming in the last 13 years. (Data accessed from 
Google Scholar on 14 Sept. 2015.) It seems safe to say that interest 
in Hamblin’s work on questions was reignited by the communicative 
turn, beginning in the late 1990s as theorists of conversational dynam-
ics rediscovered the work (e.g., Roberts 2012 [1996]), and building to 
a recent highpoint as that work has, in turn, gained influence. In the 
context of the communicative turn, Hamblin’s proposals about ques-
tions have found a broader framework within which to flourish. The 
same could be said of the effect that the recent upturn in dynamic work 
on imperatives has had on the citation patterns of earlier treatments.
 22. Thanks to Brian Rabern for pressing me on these points.
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